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In December 2001 Argentina's default on external debt pushed the country into 
crisis. To date, it was the largest default of a nation at ninety-five billion of a 115 billion 
dollar commercial debt (Mitchell 98). It was a large amount, but the debt that was 
approximately fifty percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was "not massive by 
emerging-market standards" (Crunch). In fact the debt to GDP ratio was quite 
comparable with that of other emerging markets. In a study cited by Miguel Kiguel, 
external debt to GDP of Chile, Argentina's western neighbor, was forty-five percent 
while Brazil, another neighbor, was at forty percent along with Poland. Some of the 
higher ratios ranged from that of Russia, at just over sixty percent, to the Philippines and 
Bulgaria, both were nearly eighty percent. 
The default came as no surprise to those who followed the events in Argentina. 
The country had been in a recession for nearly three years which aggravated the already 
conspicuous position it was in. What is so unusual about the country's economic situation 
is that in the beginning decades of the twentieth century it was one of the wealthiest 
nations of the world (Argentina's). Now, as the country struggles to restructure its debt 
and implement new fiscal policies, many question how a country with so many resources 
is plagued by fiscal deficits and staggering debt. 
An overview of Argentine history and a careful analysis of the country's 
macroeconomic data provide insight into the reasons for the December 2001 default. It 
also provides answers as to why the country was unable to maintain its position as one of 
the wealthiest nations. Of course looking at history always allows for conclusions to be 
drawn about the present, and, to assure that this paper is more than a historical report I 
intend to use my analysis to both verify where Argentina has been and where it is going. 
Harold2 
As sue~ in making this analysis it becomes clear that the December default was not 
entirely harmful, at least as it relates to continued growth of the Argentine economy, and 
in fact, it can be seen as a logical step forward. I must emphasize that the default has had 
serious repercussions, and I am in no way suggesting default is a good thing in the 
broader picture. 
The social conditions leading up to and following the default also provide insight 
to the path that Argentina will take as it moves into the future. The unusual circumstances 
in Argentina have created an interesting cultural phenomenon. Because of Argentina's 
wealth at the beginning of the twentieth century its people, enjoying the success of the 
early decades, developed a sense of superiority over their Latin American neighbors. 
Their capital, Buenos Aires, has come to be referred to as the Paris of South America. 
However, this period of prosperity came to an end and the situation deteriorated, even in 
comparison with that of its neighbors; the social outlook of Argentina is changing. 
Beginning to answer the question of how it happened, I look back to the post 
World War II era. From about the middle of the twentieth century until the beginning of 
the 90's, Argentina suffered from a lack of effective leadership and the inability of the 
government to form a cohesive unit to implement the changes necessary to advance 
productivity. Juan 3HURQperhaps best known as the husband ofEvita, served as the 
president of Argentina in the years after World War IT. Strongly influenced by fascism, 
he became the model leader of populism. He nationalized large parts of the economy, set 
up trade barriers, and cut Argentina off from the world economy. Though there was 
popular support at the time, PerRn set Argentina on a path of inflation and destroyed the 
foundation of economic growth. These set backs have had lasting effects that Argentina is 
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still struggling to overcome. However, it is hardly fair to put all the blame on one 
administration when there have been numerous administrations since Peron's that could 
have implemented the necessary changes. This is easier said than done and, 
unfortunately, the 30-year period following Per6n was filled with instability. There were 
rapid changes of elected presidents and military juntas (Y ergin and Stanislaw 240). 
In such chaos, little was done to effectively return Argentina to prosperity, and 
although the economy did grow in the 70's, it did not last long. The steady growth of the 
70's came to an end at the close of the decade. During the 80's, often referred to as the 
"Lost Decade," there was virtually no growth in Real GDP (Gross Domestic Product). By 
1990 GDP per capita was at its lowest over the previous twenty year period as shown in 
the graph below. 
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The loss of the Falkland War in the early 1980's marked the end of the "revolving 
door administrations" when the military leadership relinquished the presidency to 
democratically elected RaXl Alfonsin. Alfonsin implemented widespread market reforms 
that included privatization. However, the past decades of degradation of the Argentine 
economy, through corruption and bad fiscal policy, could not easily be undone. Inflation 
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had reached 20,000 percent, the economy was contracting and food riots were taking 
place (Yergin and Stanislaw 241). 
Finally, in 1991, after having served for three years as the Foreign Minister, 
Domingo Cavallo took control of the Argentine economy as head of the Ministry of 
Economy. Cavallo, a graduate of Harvard with a Ph.D. in Economics, immediately began 
shock therapy to stimulate competition and growth. 1 He matched the Argentine peso to 
the dollar with the Convertibility Law thus ending the long period of inflation and the 
continual devaluation of the peso. The Convertibility Law had other implications such as 
strengthening of the Central Bank of Argentina, the nation's equivalent to the Federal 
Reserve of the U.S., and allowing deposits to be denominated in dollars or pesos (K.iguel 
83). This provided stability and stimulated growth. 
The changes implemented by Cavallo provided for strong growth and price 
stability which had not been seen since the early part of the century. GDP grew at a 
steady rate during the 90's generally only suffering major declines due to external factors. 
The graph below shows the fairly steady growth in GDP from the early 90's to the default 
in the end of2001. There are two obvious exceptions to the growth in nominal GDP. The 
first began entering 1995 and was due to issues in Mexico, known as the Tequila Effect. 
The second decline began in the second quarter of 1998 and was due to the Russian 
default coupled with the Brazilian devaluation. In both cases the decrease in GDP is due 
to investors' concerns in the wake of such crisis in other emerging markets. The recovery 
that began in the latter half of 1999 was ended as investors began to worry about default. 
Their speculation is also reflected in the rapid decline in GDP leading up to the default in 
the end of2001. 
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To Wlderstand how investors' concerns play such a vital role one must understand 
that the major part of the economic growth recognized during the 90's was due to inflows 
of capital from foreign investors. Therefore the Argentine economy was very sensitive to 
changes in capital flows. This was an obvious disadvantage in the sense that it was a 
constraint on the economy, but it was also the only source for such rapid growth. With 
this short explanation I leave the topic for now to focus on other aspects of the 
convertibility regime but will provide more insight to the topic of capital flow later with 
reference to the balance of payments. 
Looking at a table of macroeconomic indicators as a comparison between the past 
two decades shows the widespread effects that Cavallo's changes had on the Argentine 
economy. 
Table 1: 
Selected Macroeconomic Indicators (% average !J;TOwth per year) 
1981-1990 1991-2000 
MarketGDP -1.30% 4.45% 
Employment 1.07% 1.64%1 
Total Factor Productivity -1.0% 1.64% 
Exports 3.40% 9.18% 
Inflation 787.0% 21.4% 
Fiscal Deficit (% GDP) -6.4% -2.0%2 
1) 1991-1999; 2) 1986-1990 
Source: FIEL 
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The improvements seen in the 90's were an obvious result of the Convertibility 
Law and other government policies that prompted growth. Obvious in that the large 
decrease in inflation and the increase of employment and productivity were factors 
accompanying the parity of the peso to the dollar and the increase of GDP respectively. 
The improvement in the fiscal deficit was also closely related to the increase in GDP 
which had its most obvious effect, as related to the fiscal deficit, of increasing tax 
revenues. The government adopted a policy of privatization and this, of course, attracted 
foreign investors which in turn stimulated the finance sectors of the economy and an 
inflow of capital. Privatization was also key to improving the fiscal deficit as the 
government was able to get rid of public utilities and other business ventures that they 
were unable to operate efficiently. Exports grew at an increasingly rapid rate despite the 
overvalued peso which I will return to in discussion of the foreign currency exchange and 
the balance of payments as they are closely related. The changes had widespread positive 
effects on the economy. They were immediately seen, and they demonstrated the 
potential of the country. 
However, despite the indications of progress the country was still struggling. 
Failure to improve economic policy in stride with the positive effects of the 
Convertibility Law hindered growth and accentuated debt, i.e. the continued fiscal deficit. 
Also the convertibility plan of Cavallo's, which was undoubtedly a necessary input for 
things to improve in Argentina, had its negative effects, and perhaps, can be seen as the 
cause of the December default. That is to say that the negative effects of the plan were 
not able to be dealt with while the superficial picture of widespread economic growth 
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attracted speculative investors' capitals that in essence would "fund" the default in 2001. 
It was no help that the country entered a recessionary period in 1998 due to external 
factors discussed above (refer to above graph ofGDP Evolution 1993-2002). The 
Brazilian devaluation was especially important in respect to the recession of '98 because 
not only did it cause concerns in the capital markets, it is also Argentina's largest trading 
partner and accounts for over twenty-five percent of Argentine imports and exports (CIA 
World Fact Book). 
The overall effect that the recession had on the economy was two fold and quite 
detrimental. First, but not necessarily foremost, the recession aggravated the fiscal deficit 
by reducing tax income. This only encouraged investor worry which then in tum caused 
capital inflows to cease. Because the growth that had taken place was largely a result of 
these capital inflows, as they slowed they also aggravated the situation with the fiscal 
deficit. The situation thus fed on itself, and the only hope to stop it was outside funding 
of the debt. 
With default on the horizon, Argentina's finance secretary Daniel Marx, was 
negotiating with the IMF (International Monetary Fund) as well as with the U.S. (which 
opposed any further loans) to refinance the debt. 3 Around August 2001, as the public debt 
approached some $128 billion, three times Argentina's annual foreign earnings, Cavallo 
introduced a zero-deficit law with the intent of reassuring investors. Cavallo continued to 
assure that, "Argentina will not devalue, will not default on its debt" (Argentina on 
Tenterhooks). 
However, investors were not convinced, and they continued to worry about the 
increasing debt. The worry perhaps was induced by lessons learned from the unexpected 
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Russian default and the Asian crisis. 2 The Russian default took the market by surprise 
and so investors were tuning themselves into the indicators that would protect them from 
another surprise episode. Much had been learned from the Asian crisis as well, and 
investors were playing it safe knowing that the situation in Argentina would not be easily 
remedied. With the information gathered from these past experiences, they not only 
worried, but according to the IMF, the default was ''widely anticipated" and the "gradual 
deterioration of [Argentina's] credit quality gave market participants sufficient time to 
exit the bond and credit protection markets ... " (69). 
This view is all supported by information complied by J.P. Morgan, Chase, and 
the IMF. The credit default swap curve shows the recovery value of bonds in the event of 
default as well as the ability of a sovereign to meet it external debt obligations. The curve 
is based on the Emerging Market Bond Index (plus) which is a valuation of debt 
instruments that are regularly traded and thus data is readily available. As such, the curve 
shows the market's view of default probabilities.4 Default probabilities for Argentina 
show that the curve spiked near the end of 2000, but approval of an IMF package 
reversed the sharp spike and reassured investors smoothing out the curve. However, in 
the beginning of 2001 the slope of the curve began to rapidly increase which showed the 
increasingly pessimistic outlook of the market. By the end of the second half of 2001 
default probabilities were at level never seen before, and by December trading had 
stopped completely as no investor was willing to ''take a long position on Argentina 
credit risk, a position validated by Argentina's default in December 2001" (International 
Monetary Fund 61). 
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The failure of the government to effect changes in fiscal policies brings to light 
one of the issues that stands out as being a major contributor to the debt crisis. Operating 
with a fiscal deficit, though reduced from previous years, continued to increase 
Argentina's external debt. As debt continued to build over the decade it seemed to be of 
little consequence in light of the continued growth of the economy. There was a 
continued inflow of capital and investors' outlooks, as indicated by trading of credit 
default swaps discussed above, showed that they maintained an optimistic outlook 
through the beginning of the recession. However, in the closing years of the "Golden 
Decade," as the economy entered into the third year of recession, investors began to 
worry about the country's growing debt obligation and its ability to service that debt. 
This correlates with the credit default swap curve and the graph below which shows the 
increase in external debt leading up to the 2001 default. 
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Now I tum to the negative effects of the Convertibility Law and the issues that 
evolved from them. One of the issues that arose from the dollar parity was the 
overvaluation of the peso. Currency exchange rates play a significant role in respect to 
the world economy and are therefore very important in understanding how the dollar 
parity contributed to the default. The overvaluation of the peso was a direct result of 
linking the peso to the dollar regardless of market supply and demand of the Argentine 
Harold 10 
currency. Because the demand for dollars was higher than that of the peso, linking the 
two currencies broke what would have been the market equilibrium between supply and 
demand of the peso. This made the exchange rate higher than it would have otherwise 
been on the foreign exchange markets. This also put extra strain on the Central Bank of 
Argentina, which had just been restructured to support the Convertibility Law. 
The obvious effect of the overvaluation of the peso is that it was more expensive 
to acquire the Argentine currency, and this, in effect, raised prices of Argentine exports. I 
stress that the actual price of exports as denominated in Argentine pesos was not directly 
changed by the dollar parity. Only as holders of other currencies had to purchase the 
"expensive" peso did the price of exports "increase." 
This would tend to dampen growth of exports, but as stated above, exports did 
grow and at a more rapid rate. The reason for the increase in exports must be linked then 
to other factors. Two things played a role in the growth. First, due to the stability and 
rapid growth of the economy that came out of the convertibility regime, i.e. privatization, 
the overall increase in the sovereign's productivity, political measures taken to promote 
trade, as a whole the absolute volume of transactions increased. The second was a 
decrease in the export prices of most Argentine primary products, noting the exception of 
oil (Kiguel91). 
The decrease in export prices had its origin in both the dollar parity as well as 
world market conditions. Argentine exporters had to decrease prices in order to 
compensate for the effective increase in price due to the overvaluation of the peso. This 
allowed them to remain competitive in the world market. Overall the dollar parity hurt 
the export sector domestically because there was little flexibility in the labor markets as 
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well as a continued appreciation of the dollar against the Euro and Yen, exporters were 
unable to recognize as many quantifiable benefits as other sectors of the economy 
(Kiguel91). This situation especially shows the dichotomy of the convertibility regime. 
Another important issue that arose from the dollar parity and was also an 
indication that the Argentine economy was not as healthy as it appeared on the surface 
was seen in the balance of payments. The statement is very important in that is shows the 
transactions that cross national boundaries and thus efficiently shows the factors that 
were substantial contributors to the December default. This includes imports/exports, 
capital flows, and changes in reserves, but my focus is on the first two which I perceive 
as being more important as related to the default. 
I start with the current account, which is traditionally the first section of the 
balance of payments and shows the net unilateral transfers abroad. Looking at the data 
the account continued to show a large and increasing debit balance until1999. (Refer to 
graph of balance of payments below.) The debit balance indicates that imports 
outweighed exports and thus the foreign currency exchange market was being fed pesos 
at a higher rate than they were being demanded in respect to aggregate monetary values 
of goods and services. This does not necessarily have to be a problem as the U.S. has 
operated with a trade deficit for years. However, the U.S. has a strong economy that is 
able to support its trade deficit. The implication that the Argentine economy is not able to 
do the same is explained by the capital account which follows the current account in the 
balance of payments. This leads to a careful analysis of Argentina's capital account, 
which I have alluded to throughout as being a major issue in the growth and eventual 
failure of the sovereign's ability to service its debt. 
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The capital account is made up simply of the inflow of foreign capital and the 
outflow of Argentine capital; as such, the account balance shows the net capital flows for 
a period. A credit balance indicates an excess inflow of capitals, a demand for the peso. 
The reason for such a large balance is due to the factors discussed above, privatization, 
stability, etc. No doubt this inflow of capital was useful in stimulating growth in the short 
term. However, because the argentine economy's growth was so sensitive to the inflows, 
perhaps I can go so far as to say solely dependent on them, it made the situation 
precarious as it was largely dependent on the whims of investors. Looking at the above 
graph and referencing the capital account it becomes evident that there is a direct relation 
between capital inflows and GDP. This is especially true in Argentina's situation 
because the economic growth was, for the most part, being financed through these 
inflows of capital, as opposed to regular savings, which tied the majority of economic 
growth to capital inflows. 
Noting how the two are so closely related it also becomes evident that changes in 
investors' outlooks would have a rather large effect on the sovereign's economy. This in 
turn made the financial markets more susceptible to problems as the debt to GDP ratio 
worsened due to the poor financial management coupled with the recession as discussed 
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above. As the economy continued to suffer and investors began to worry, capital inflows 
began to subside which only aggravated the already deteriorating fiscal situation. This 
caused a further decrease in capital inflows, financing capabilities continued to suffer, 
Argentina began struggling to pay or even service the debt. 
The situation eventually cut into reserves indicating that the central bank would 
not be able to maintain the dollar parity for long. At this, the building tension in the 
political arena exploded. There were wide spread manifestaciones, (demonstrations). 
Within a week, the political unrest led first, to the resignation of Cavallo, and soon after 
President Fernando de la Rua. The presidency changed hands numerous times through 
the end of December. Finally enough political stability came when the entering 
"caretaker" president, Eduardo Duhalde, who assumed office January 2, 2002, promptly 
ended the fixed exchange rate (Mitchell 98). 
The economic instability and uncertainties surrounding the recovery from such a 
crisis were immediately seen. As the dollar link ended, the Argentine peso lost strength 
against the dollar and in six months was trading at nearly four pesos to the dollar.5 There 
were continued demonstrations in Plaza de Mayo, the plaza in front of La Casa Rosada 
(Pink House), Argentina's equivalent of the White House. Stores were robbed and looted 
by large mobs. Such mobs were even seen in smaller communities in the rural parts of 
Argentina. 6 
Also as the default is perhaps, and hopefully, a fmal manifestation of the 
seemingly blight outlook for Argentina, its people are looking for answers to how their 
country went from such a position of dominance, to poverty and general economic 
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weakness. Of course, in light of the recent events, they will more generally speaking, be 
searching for someone to blame. 
Two books that were published just prior to the default give good indication that 
the Argentine population is looking within. In a review of the two books, The Awful 
Charm of Being Argentine by Marcos Aguinis, and Reality: Awakeningfrom the 
Argentine Dream by Mariano Grondona, Santiago Real de Azua claims that the two 
authors, both accomplished public intellectuals, are analyzing the Argentine culture. 
Each author looks at the issues that have formed public policies and have played a role in 
the countries development, though neither blames the situation solely on Argentines (88). 
The books' titles alone say a great deal about the Argentine people and what they are 
facing socially. 
The situation has lead to a general ambivalence in the Argentine public. 
According to Anna Puertas the general feeling in Argentina is one of confusion as to 
what comes next. As the presidential election approaches, the polls confirm these feelings 
as no candidate stands out above the rest (Cierra). Though each candidate has proposed 
some ideas about how to go about the restructuring of Argentina, there is apparently no 
outstanding candidate with a definitive plan for the economic recovery of the country. 
The popular slogan "Que se vayan todos," (Kick them all out) sums up very well the 
general feeling of Argentine sentiment towards the government (Crying). 
Nevertheless, the caretaker government under Duhalde has provided a surprising 
amount of stability in light of the situation. They have begun to implement strategies to 
deal with the fall out of the default and as a result the peso has strengthened. Recently it 
has been trading closer to three to one which is where Argentine officials wish to have it 
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stabilized (El d6lar). This shows that Argentina is beginning to move in the direction of 
prosperity. Uncertainty still remains, and the debate of how to make necessary changes 
continues. However, many investors realize the potential of Argentina and have not 
abandoned all hope. 
The new administration will face difficult issues. The caretaker government has 
only taken small steps to help insure stability and growth but they have saved the larger 
issues for the elected officials. One of the major issues that it will face is the struggle to 
work out repayment of the debt. It is complicated by the fact that some fifty-two billion 
of its foreign paper is held by investors ranging from small middle class shopkeepers to 
the fund managers on Wall Street and in a number of different countries including Great 
Britain, Germany, Japan, and the U.S. (Pruitt 1). There is no easy solution to the 
problems, but overcoming them is possible. A lot of progress has been made and 
Argentina has already begun to recover. 
Argentina has come a long way in a short time considering the degradation that 
had to be overcome. The rapid growth in the 90's shows that Argentina has the potential 
to return to the prosperity that it enjoyed in the early decades of the last century. The 
default in 2001 demonstrates that it is going to take time and careful planning, and that it 
can not be done on the coattails of the dollar. Continued recovery of the currency's 
viability has been and will continue to be a major issue in turning Argentina's economy 
around. 
Though the default has been hard on the Argentine people and investors, it should 
not be said that it was a total loss. With the break of the dollar-peso link there will be less 
rigidity in the system. Although there is still a lack of confidence and worry about the 
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Balanza de pagos. Anos 1198/2000 
Balanza de pagos 1996" 1997" 1998" 1999" 2000* 
Mlllones de u$s 
CUENTA CORRIENTE -.6,825 -12,286 -14,554 -11,945 -.6,909 
Blenes 1,760 -2.123 -3,097 -795 2,558 
Exportaciones FOB 24,043 26,431 26,434 23,309 26,410 
lmportaciones FOB 22,283 28,554 29,531 24,103 23,852 
Servicios -3,526 -4,392 -4,435 -4,056 -4,237 
Exportaciones de servicios reales 4,330 4,468 4,701 4,527 4,596 
lmportaciones de servicios reales 7,856 8,860 9,138 8,583 8,833 
Renta -0,502 -6,223 -7,417 -7,473 -7.517 
,QWHUHVHV -3,391 -4,220 -0,115 -5.896 -6,001 
Ganados 3,966 4,614 5,236 6,433 6,387 
Pagados 7;J57 8,833 10,352 11,329 12,388 
Utilldades y dividendos -2,119 -1,999 -2,295 -1,576 -1,513 
Otros 6 -0 -7 1 -2 
Transferencias corrientes 444 451 396 379 287 
CUENTA CAPITAL Y FINANCIERA 12,411 16,557 18,319 14,299 9,070 
I. Sector BancDrio -173 -1,074 3,506 1,678 28 
BCRA 1,003 -686 -512 -1,033 762 
Otras entidades financieras -1,176 -488 4,018 2,711 -734 
II. Sector Publico no Finenciero 9,032 8,172 9,382 10,845 8,254 
Gobierno Nacional 8,763 6,815 9,528 10,086 7,449 
Gobiernos locales 733 1,733 149 1,384 1,238 
Empresas y RWURV -464 -376 -313 -586 -433 
Ill. Sector Privado No )LQDQFLHUR 3,552 9,458 5,452 1,778 788 
ERRORES Y OMISIONES -1,705 -997 -327 -1,153 -600 
VARIACION DE RESERVAS INTERNACIONALES 3,882 3,273 3,436 1,201 -439 
iTEM DE MEMORANDUM 
Importaciones CIF 23,1165 30,450 31,377 25,508 25,243 
Nota: Los totales por sumas pueden no coincidir por los redondeos en ODV
cifras parciales. 
• datos provisorios 
Fuente: INDEC 
9.3.6. Eslimaci6n d9 Ia Deuda Externa Brute por sector rasidente. 
Al31 de diciembra de 1996/2000 
Deuda Extema Bruta 31/1211996* 
Total 109,756 
Sector publico no financiero y Banco Central 73,511 
Bonos y trtulos publicos (1) 46,079 
Deuda rafinanciada en el Plan Financiero 1992 
Organismos intemacionales 15,710 
Acreedores oficiales 10,040 
Bancos comerciales 1,346 
Proveedores y otros 336 
Sector privado no financiero (2) 20,589 
Bonos y WLWXORVprivados 8,278 
Organismos internacionales 757 
Acreedoras oficiales 2,105 
Bancos participantes 1,165 
Deuda bancaria diracta 7,160 
Proveedores y otros 1,124 
Sector financiero (sin Banco Central) (3) 15,656 
Bonos y tftulos (4) 3,975 
/LQHDVde FUHGLWR 6,948 
Organismos internaclonales 501 
Dep6aitos 1,803 
Obligaciones diversas (5) 2,829 
Item de Memorandum 
31/1211997* 31/1211998* 
---- --~ 
Millones de u$s 
125,096 141,957 
74,912 83,111 
48,942 55,585 
16,561 18,916 
7,881 7,248 
1,318 1,240 
210 122 
29,595 38,540 
12,975 18,859 
616 817 
2,401 2,409 
1,138 984 
10,849 13,430 
1,417 2,040 
20,589 22,306 
5,064 6,161 
7,407 8,522 
459 431 
2,822 2,354 
4,837 4,838 
Obligaciones diversas con contrapartida en el activo (6) 1,805 3,731 3,747 
(1) La linea de bonos y trtulos publicos inciuye los bonos Par y con descuento, 
correspondientes al Plan Financiero 1992. 
(2) No incluye obHgaciones con matrices incorporades en las estimaciones 
de inversion dlracta. 
(3) Segun surge de Ia clasificacl6n presentada en los estados contables de 
las entidades. 
(4) lnciuye trtulos de deude emitidos por las entidades flnancieras. 
(5) Se incluyen en este rubro, ademas de otros conceptos, operaciones de pase y 
compras y ventas al contado a liquidar que reflejan un deracho y una obligaci6n futura 
y que se ragistran contablemente an rubros del activo y del pesivo por LJXDOmonto. 
(6) lncluidas en obligaciones diversas y en creditos diversos. 
Nota: Los totales por suma pueden no coincidir por los radondeos en las 
cifras perciales. 
Fuente: INDEC. 
31/1211999* 3111212000* 
-~ 
145,994 146,395 
85,396 85,065 
58,409 58,066 
-
20,167 21,639 
5,754 4,432 
940 805 
126 123 
36,970 36,555 
17,243 18,226 
1,187 1,165 
2,324 2,454 
1,312 1,154 
12,512 13,306 
2,390 2,250 
23,828 24,775 
6,349 6,598 
9,781 8,334 
499 465 
2,630 3,788 
4,369 5,590 
3,362 4,781 
9.3.6. Estimaci6n de Ia Deuda Extema Bruta por sector residente. 
Al 31 de diciembre de 1996/2000 
Deuda Extema Brute 3111211996. 3111211997" 
--- - ---
Total 109,756 
Sector publico no financiero y Banco Central 73,511 
Bonos y titulos publicos (1) 46,079 
Deuda refinanciada en el Plan Financiero 1992 
Organismos intemacionales 15,710 
Acreedores oficiales 10,040 
Bancos comerciales 1,346 
Proveedores y otros 336 
Sector privado no financiero (2) 20,589 
Bonos y tltulos privados 8,278 
Organismos intemacionales 757 
Acreedores oficiales 2,105 
Bancos participantes 1,165 
Deuda bancaria directa 7,160 
Proveedores y otros 1,124 
Sector financiero (sin Banco Central) (3) 15,656 
Bonos y titulos (4) 3,975 
Lineas de credito 6,948 
Organismos intemacionales 501 
Oep6sitos 1,603 
Obligaciones diversas (5) 2,629 
Item de Memorandum 
Obligaciones diversas con contrapartida en el activo (6) 1,805 
(1) La linea de bonos y titulos publicos incluye los bonos Par y con descuento, 
correspondientes al Plan Financiero 1992. 
(2) No incluye obligaciones con matrices incorporadas en las estimaciones 
de inversi6n directs. 
(3) Segun surge de Ia clasificaci6n presentada en los estados contables de 
las entidades. 
( 4) lncluye titulos de deuda emitidos por las entidades financieras. 
(5) Se induyen en este rubro, ademas de otros conceptos, operaciones de pase y 
compras y ventas al contado a liquidar que reflejan un derecho y una obligaci6n futura 
y que se registran contablemente en rubros del activo y del pasivo por igual monto. 
(6) lncluidas en obligaciones diversas yen creditos diversos. 
Nota: Los totales por suma pueden no coincidir por los redondeos en las 
cifras parciales. 
Fuente: INDEC. 
125,096 
74,912 
48,942 
16,561 
7,881 
1,318 
210 
29,595 
12,975 
816 
2,401 
1,138 
10,849 
1,417 
20,589 
5,064 
7,407 
459 
2,822 
4,837 
3,731 
3111211998" 31/1211999. 31/1212000" 
Millones de u$s 
141 ,957 145,994 146,395 
83,111 85,396 85,065 
55,585 58;409 58,066 
18,916 20,167 21,639 
7,248 5,754 4,432 
1,240 940 805 
122 126 123 
36,540 36,970 36,555 
16,859 17,243 16,226 
817 1,187 1,165 
2,409 2,324 2,454 
984 1,312 1,154 
13,430 12,512 13,306 
2,040 2,390 2,250 
22,306 23,628 24,775 
6,161 6,349 6,598 
8,522 9,781 8,334 
431 499 465 
2,354 2,630 3,788 
4,838 4,369 5,590 
3,747 3,362 4,781 
Producto lntemo Bruto a precios de mercado, serie trimestral y anual, desde 1993 en adelante 
En millones de pesos Variaci6n % respecto En millones de pesos Variaci6n % respecto 
Perlodo a precios constantes de 1993 al mismo perlodo a precios corrientes al mismo perlodo 
del ano ,anterior del a no anterior 
1993 236,505 236,505 
1-93 216,370 212,627 
11-93 241,872 241,255 
111-93 242,646 243,494 
IV-93 245,132 248,644 
1994 250,308 5.8 257,440 8.9 
1-94 232,945 7.7 235,083 10.6 
11-94 257,477 6.5 263,684 9.3 
111-94 253,468 4.5 260,870 7.1 
IV-94 257,342 5.0 270,123 8.6 
1995 243,186 -2.8 258,032 0.2 
1-95 237,968 2.2 250,406 6.5 
11-95 248,094 -3.6 261,603 -0.8 
111-95 242,215 -4.4 256,868 -1.5 
IV-95 244,468 -5.0 263,250 -2.5 
1996 256,626 5.5 272,150 5.5 
1-96 236,566 -0.6 251,200 0.3 
11-96 260,752 5.1 280,167 7.1 
111-96 262,167 8.2 274,502 6.9 
IV-96 267,020 9.2 282,730 7.4 
1997 277,441 8.1 292,859 7.6 
1-97 256,388 8.4 271,260 8.0 
11-97 281,770 8.1 299,873 7.0 
11197 284,092 8.4 298,265 8.7 
IV97 287,515 7.7 302,038 6.8 
1998 288,123 3.9 298,948 2. 1 
198 271,702 6.0 282,764 4.2 
11 98 301,208 6.9 312,129 4.1 
111 98 293,315 3.2 305,475 2.4 
IV98 286,268 -0.4 295,425 -2.2 
1999 278,369 ·3.4 283,523 -5.2 
199 265,025 -2.5 270,746 -4.3 
1199 286,412 -4.9 288,830 -7.5 
11199 278,473 -5.1 285,087 -6.7 
IV99 283,566 -0.9 289,429 -2.0 
2000 * 276,173 -0.8 284,204 0.2 
I 00 * 264,556 -0.2 270,444 -0.1 
II 00 * 285,275 -0.4 291,796 1.0 
11100 * 276,768 -0.6 287,496 0.8 
IVOO * 278,092 -1.9 287,079 -0.8 
2001 * 263,997 -4.4 268,697 -5.5 
t 01 * 259200 -2.0 263,331 -2.6 
II 01 * 284,796 -0.2 288,026 -1.3 
Ill 01 * 263,127 -4.9 271,367 -5.6 
IV01 . 248,865 -10.5 252,063 -12.2 
2002 * 235,121 -10.9 313,039 16.5 
I 02 . 216,849 -16.3 237,057 -10.0 
II 02 . 246,315 -13.5 339,008 17.7 
Ill 02 . 237,417 -9.8 334,006 23.1 
IV02 • 239,902 -3.6 342084 35.7 
• Dato provisorio 
Fuente: INDEC, Direcci6n Nacional de Cuentas Nacionales 
TABLE 8.5 
BCRA International reserves and Financial liabilities
in Milion Pesos 
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12131/1994 
6130/1995 
12/3111995 
6/30/1996 
12131/1996 
6/30/1997 
12/3111997 
6130/1996 
12131/1998 
1129/1999 
2126/1999 
3/31/1999 
4/30/1999 
513111999 
6/30/1999 
7131/1999 
8131/1999 
9130/1999 
10/3111999 
11130/1999 
12130/1999 
1/3112000 
2129/2000 
3/3112000 
4130/2000 
513112000 
6/3012000 
7/3112000 
8/3112000 
9/30/2000 
10/3112000 
11/3012000 
1212912000 
1/3112001 
2128/2001 
3131/2001 
4130/2001 
5/31/2001 
6/30/2001 
7/3112001 
6131/2001 
9/30/2001 
10/3112001 
11/3012001 
12/3112001 
113112002 
212812002 
3/3112002 
4/30/2002 
5131/2002 
6130/2002 
7131/2002 
8/31/2002 
913012002 
10/31/2002 
11/30/2002 
12/31/2002 
1131/2003 
16,028 
12,602 
15,049 
16,251 
17,503 
19,501 
22,482 
22,923 
24,906 
24.006 
24,283 
23,666 
23,836 
23,568 
23,243 
24,311 
23,021 
21 ,915 
22,537 
23,769 
26,407 
24,414 
24,821 
24,729 
24,719 
23,784 
25,867 
26,086 
24,638 
24,890 
23,249 
22,441 
25,148 
25,437 
25,377 
21.924 
20,547 
20,197 
21,082 
16,693 
14,378 
20,584 
18,080 
14,740 
14,548 
19,234 
29,822 
37,061 
35,904 
36,867 
36,591 
33,070 
32,949 
35,266 
34,548 
35,779 
35,231 
30215 
1,901 
2,351 
2,543 
2,666 
1,793 
1,865 
1,826 
1,712 
1,618 
1,668 
1,681 
1,630 
1,732 
1,652 
1,510 
1,588 
1,588 
1,521 
1,582 
1,459 
1,424 
1,403 
1,445 
1,457 
1,444 
1,548 
1,508 
1,461 
1,457 
1,395 
1,292 
1,285 
1,343 
1,367 
1,479 
1,448 
1,821 
2,027 
1,671 
1,648 
1,885 
572 
2,065 
3,728 
4,879 
7,945 
17,929 
14,953 
17,592 
20,021 
19,296 
21,366 
24,308 
24,635 
•26,524 
25,674 
25,964 
25,296 
25,588 
25,220 
24,753 
25,879 
24,609 
23,436 
24,099 
25,228 
27 ,831 
25,817 
26,266 
26,166 
26,163 
25,332 
27,375 
27,547 
26,095 
26,285 
24,541 
23,726 
26,491 
26,804 
26,856 
23,372 
22,368 
22,224 
22,753 
18,341 
16,263 
21,156 
20,145 
18,468 
19,425 
27,179 
29,822 
37,061 
35,904 
36,667 
36,591 
33,070 
32,949 
35,266 
34,548 
35,779 
35,231 
30215 
16,267 
13,131 
13,769 
13,441 
14,059 
14,041 
15,975 
15,013 
16,392 
14,975 
14,612 
14,551 
14,339 
14,223 
14,117 
14,790 
14,353 
13,987 
13,972 
13,921 
16,524 
14,637 
14,038 
13,686 
13,950 
13,575 
13,810 
14,348 
13,680 
13,614 
13,402 
13,377 
15,100 
13,897 
13,748 
13,680 
13,339 
13,030 
20,943 
16,728 
14,663 
16,665 
16,234 
15,201 
17,769 
20,313 
22,095 
20,506 
21,325 
20,852 
20,266 
20,661 
21,472 
22,903 
24,852 
27,439 
30,165 
30470 
177 
188 
447 
462 
687 
1,711 
1,736 
2,485 
2,417 
2,604 
3431 
44 
68 
343 
952 
801 
846 
948 
714 
1,011 
931 
833 
0 
-509 
1,873 
3,548 
4,110 
5,792 
6,426 
7,596 
8,300 
8,912 
9,822 
9,146 
9,585 
9,583 
9,231 
9,589 
8,662 
7,954 
8,575 
9,816 
9,783 
9,581 
10,482 
10,874 
10,784 
10,272 
11,925 
11,646 
10,771 
10,931 
9,507 
8,614 
9,465 
10,877 
11,242 
7,773 
7,067 
7,154 
-98 
·1,662 
-2,112 
-1,443 
-2,265 
-3,983 
-5,079 
-7,046 
-7,577 
-6,822 
-5,841 
-5,325 
-4,778 
-4,322 
-4,131 
-310 
-303 
-266 
-255 
-224 
674 
1,509 
914 
1,104 
2,242 
1,333 
325 
462 
1,343 
425 
2,930 
1,533 
660 
1,170 
1,939 
660 
1,078 
1,404 
1,872 
2,197 
935 
1,026 
1,204 
2,187 
652 
452 
2,118 
1,277 
476 
906 
116 
919 
1,769 
3,321 
668 
1,116 
872 
377 
474 
91 
67 
685 
224 
62 
367 
271 
197 
105 
783 
51 
42 
50 
324 
306 
193 
108 
67 
139 
0 
566 
1,470 
1,732 
2,339 
3,993 
4,450 
5,854 
7,650 
10,597 
14,090 
15,541 
16,405 
16,971 
17,332 
17,299 
17,277 
17,395 
17 371 
(") Figures in p~sos are valued aceotding to closing offflr exchallf/6 rete set by Banco cte Is Nsci6n AlfJSnllna Included In thetas/ column. 
FigutBs In US <lol/ars can be obl>lined by apply/"9 in each 6/e the exchange 1818 mported In lha last column. 
(e) Does not inc/11<1& cufl'llncies being counterparts or "0/har Government Deposits". The latter are not included in nnancialliabiliNes either. 
To obtain the variatiOfl of internelional reserves or the balance of payments "Other Government Depo$/ts" must be inciiJCIIJd In column (1]. 
(b) Beginning In February 12, pub//!; securities nominated in US aollars 818 not includec! as lntemalional ,.,..,,.,.,s, accOiding to 
il~m 33 or Centra/Bank Cherll.Jiw Ner. 24,144 modified by Law Ner. 25,502. 
(c) Beginning In January 1997, cummcies <181/vared as countarpert of "Government Deposits to BCRA • account 818 ~>xclu<led. 
Thesa figuRJs el8 al•o exc/IJCIIJd from financial 1/abi~. 
Source: B.C.R.A. (Cent"'/ bank of the Arpentinfl RepubHc) 
1,791 
1,104 
1,382 
2.619 
3,585 
5,028 
6,962 
7.514 
5,488 
6,500 
6,129 
6,526 
6,026 
6,665 
7,010 
6,762 
6,757 
8,765 
7,632 
6,461 
5,758 
5,660 
6,230 
6,060 
5,811 
6,365 
6,370 
6,482 
6,717 
7,423 
7,386 
6,211 
7,317 
7,395 
6,974 
6,772 
5,045 
4,996 
5,710 
3,473 
3,022 
3,330 
2,666 
393 
319 
193 
26 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
19,720 
16,057 
18,974 
22.640 
22,661 
26,394 
31,270 
32,149 
32,012 
32,174 
32,093 
31,822 
31,594 
31,865 
31,763 
32,641 
31,366 
32,201 
31,731 
31,669 
33,589 
31,477 
32,496 
32,246 
31,974 
31,697 
33,745 
34,029 
32,812 
33,706 
31,927 
29,937 
33,806 
34,199 
33,830 
30,144 
27,413 
27,220 
28,463 
21,814 
19,285 
24,486 
23,031 
18,861 
19,744 
27,372 
29,848 
37,061 
35,904 
36,667 
36,591 
33,070 
32,949 
35,266 
34,548 
35,779 
35,231 
30 215 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
100 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
100 
1.00 
100 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
140 
2.15 
2.90 
2.95 
3.60 
3.80 
3.66 
3.62 
3.73 
3.53 
3.57 
3.35 
3.24 
7.1.3. Agregados bimonetarios. Saldos a fin de mes. A diciembre de 1996/2000 
Billetes Dep6sitos 
ymonedas 
A diciembre de en poderdel Total Pesos Dolares M3(1) 
publico 
[1] [2]=[3]+[4] [3] [4] [5]=[1 ]+[2] 
Millones de $
1996 11,730 52,758 24,564 28,194 
1997 13,325 68,500 31,796 36,704 
1998 13,496 76,794 34,831 41,963 
1999 13,721 78,662 32,607 46,055 
2000 12,540 84,046 32,175 51,871 
(1) M3 es igual a los billetes y monedas en poder del publico mas los 
dep6sitos en cuentas corrientes (netos de Ia utilizaci6n de los fondos 
unificados nacionales y provinciales), caja de ahorro, plazo fijo y 
otros depositos. lncluye dep6sitos en moneda extranjera. 
Fuente: Banco Central de Ia Republica Argentina. 
64,488 
81,825 
90,290 
92,383 
96,586 
Back t() contents 
TABLE A7.5 
Emerging market sovereign risks 
J. P. Morgan indicators - In basis points .---
Venezuela I Arg-EMBI 
Differential of Argentina against: 
EMBI EMBI+ Argentina Brazil Mexico Arg-EMBJ+ Arg-Braz Arg-Mex Arg-Ven . q,w--·-
12/29/1995 1044 875 933 989 15281 -169 -58 -114 -653 
1/31/1996 852 729 760 821 1302 -123 -31 -92 -573 
2/29/1996 986 900 863 946 1531 -86 37 -46 -631 
3/29/1996 912 839 840 799 1324 -73 -1 40 -485 
4/30/1996 800 700 763 641 1129 -100 -63 59 -429 
5/31/1996 792 721 748 681 1002 -71 -27 40 -281 
6/28/1996 756 694 687 674 974 -62 7 20 -280 
7/31/1996 760 764 681 705 908 4 83 59 -144 
8/30/1996 690 718 610 597 811 28 108 121 -93 
9/30/1996 594 578 533 488 606 -16 45 90 -28 
10/31/1996 635 619 594 535 636 -16 25 84 -17 
11/29/1996 562 518 546 496 521 -44 -28 22 -3 
12/31/1996 537 494 523 478 471 -43 -29 16 23 
1/31/1997 461 419 437 369 409 -42 -18 50 10 
2/28/1997 436 390 419 342 423 -46 -29 48 -33 
3/31/1997 507 429 469 425 546 -78 -40 4 -117 
4/30/1997 475 375 457 398 500 -100 -82 -23 -1251 
5/30/1997 417 344 404 346 415 -73 -60 -2 -71 
6/30/1997 400 332 392 347 379 -68 -80 -15 -47 
7/31/1997 372 301 375 329 370 -71 -74 -28 -69 
8/29/1997 375 294 387 326 352 -81 -93 -32 -58 
9/30/1997 350 301 360 305 305 -49 -59 -4 -4 
10/31/1997 606 564 677 465 485 -42 -113 99 79 
11/28/1997 537 482 572 425 451 -55 -90 57 31 
12/31/1997 503 510 461 521 402 433 -42 -49 -80 59 28 
112/1998 501 507 462 517 405 434 -39 -45 -55 57 28 
l/5/1998 523 527 473 546 425 450 -50 -54 -73 48 23 
9/6/2001 880 882 1455 955 353 921 575 573 500 1102 535 9n12oo1 891 897 1489 971 360 8 598 592 518 1129 561 
9/10/2001 891 898 1486 972 355 932 595 588 514 1131 554 
9/11/2001 876 889 1478 961 349 920 602 589 517 1129 558 
9/12/2001 
9/13/2001 928 935 1562 1025 373 933 634 627 537 1189 6291 
9/1412001 969 981 1634 1084 416 957 665 653 550 1218 677 
9/17/2001 967 980 1652 1090 406 959 685 672 562 1246 693 
9/18/2001 948 964 1618 1073 398 943 670 654 545 1220 675 
9/19/2001 952 965 1592 1076 407 949 640 627 516 1185 643 
9/20/2001 960 973 1612 1102 408 945 652 639 510 1204 667 
9/21/2001 992 999 1637 1151 423 962 645 638 486 1214 675 
9/24/2001 984 992 1612 1145 422 976 628 620 467 1190 636 
9/25/2001 996 995 1602 1152 424 991 606 607 450 1178 611 
9/26/2001 1031 1020 1639 1188 441 1021 608 619 451 1198 618 
9/2712001 1024 1026 1647 1183 454 1014 623 621 464 1193 633 
9128/2001 1004 1000 1595 1163 428 982 591 595 432 1167 613 
10/1/2001 1018 1019 1661 1191 434 1018 643 642 470 1227 643 
10/2/2001 1029 1028 1687 1192 432 1015 658 659 495 1255 672 
10/3/2001 1042 1045 1754 1215 434 1027 712 709 539 1320 727 
10/4/2001 1055 1064 1842 1241 438 1039 787 778 601 1404 803 
10/5/2001 1060 1075 1868 1246 439 1045 808 793 622 1429 823 
10/8/2001 1064 1080 1876 1256 446 1043 812 796 620 1430 833 
10/9/2001 1043 1065 1893 1232 425 1043 850 828 661 1468 850 
10/10/2001 1018 1047 1859 1188 407 1035 841 812 671 1452 824 
10/11/2001 1004 1030 1825 1172 398 1032 821 795 653 1427 793' 
10/12/2001 1001 1033 1832 1186 417 1028 831 799 646 1415 804 
10/1512001 1000 1023 1824 1163 393 1044 824 801 661 1431 780 
10/16/2001 980 1001 1770 1136 385 1044 790 769 634 1385 726 
10/17/2001 969 986 1686 1119 382 1030 717 700 567 1304 656 
10/18/2001 981 997 1727 1129 388 1045 746 730 598 1339 682 
10/19/2001 961 982 1693 1094 376 1023 732 711 599 1317 670 
10/22/2001 940 968 1678 1074 370 1018 738 710 604 1308 660 
10/23/2001 952 974 1700 1090 372 1011 748 726 610 1328 689 
10/2412001 967 986 1727 1105 379 1023 760 741 622 1348 704 
10/25/2001 975 998 1769 1119 383 1025 794 771 650 1386 744 
10/26/2001 981 1009 1824 1129 385 1026 843 815 695 1439 798 
10/29/2001 1020 1050 2003 1191 396 1038 983 953 812 1607 9651 
10/30/2001 1023 1065 2032 1180 404 1040 1009 967 852 1628 992 
10/31/2001 1027 1084 2136 1179 415 1046 1109 1052 957 1721 1090 
. 11/1/2001 1037 1092 2295 1191 418 1051 1258 1203 1104 1877 1244 
11/2/2001 1044 1120 2585 1185 402 1064 1541 1465 1400 2183 1521 
11/5/2001 1016 1098 2458 1138 396 1064 1442 1360 1320 2062 1394 
11/6/2001 1008 1080 2363 1123 398 1065 1355 1283 1240 1965 1298 
11/7/2001 986 1068 2354 1083 401 1066 1368 1286 1271 1953 1288 
11/8/2001 954 1043 2351 1054 387 1051 1397 1308 1297 1964 1300 
11/9/2001 955 1050 2438 1054 387 1042 1483 1388 1384 2051 1396 
11/12/2001 972 1064 2504 1074 1060 1532 1440 1430 1444 
11/13/2001 931 1041 2542 1010 378 1056 1611 1501 1532 2164 1486 
11/14/2001 905 1032 2664 988 363 1029. 1759 1632 1676 2301 1635 
11/15/2001 897 1028 2683 963 348 1083 1786 1655 1720 2335 1600 
11/16/2001 904 1028 2764 957 343 1051 1860 1736 1807 2421 1713 
11/19/2001 900 1041 2966 919 349 1074 2066 1925 2047 2617 1892 
11/20/2001 894 1042 3071 925 342 1062 2177 2029 2146 2729 2009 
11/21/2001 877 1038 3026 915 335 1025 2149 1988 2111 2691 2001 
11/22/2001 883 1035 3028 923 339 1052 2145 1993 2105 2689 1976 
11/23/2001 867 1023 2961 907 333 1040 2094 1938 2054 2628 1921 
11/26/2001 852 1003 2772 875 330 1038 1920 1769 1897 2442 1734 
11/27/2001 861 1011 2910 894 337 1019 2049 1899 2016 2573 1891 
11/28/2001 876 1027 2952 928 337 1020 2076 1925 2024 2615 1932 
11/29/2001 909 1061 3242 983 360 1051 ' 2333 2181 2259 2882 2191 
11/30/2001 905 1072 3340 978 356 1054 2435 2268 2362 2984 2286 
12/3/2001 882 1052 3196 928 358 1038 2314 2144 2268 2838 2158 
12/4/2001 864 1035 3305 912 346 1034 2441 2270 2393 2959 2271 
12/5/2001 815 793 4020 885 321 994 3205 3227 3135 3699 3026 
12/6/2001 820 791 3989 895 318 1009 3169 3198 3094 3671 2980 
12/7/2001 800 780 4149 878 307 1000 3349 3369 3271 3842 3149 
12110/2001 811 789 4218 874 316 1032 3407 3429 3344 3902 3186 
12111/2001 814 792 4162 875 319 1042 3348 3370 3287 3843 3120 
12/12/2001 797 779 4044 856 311 1011 ' 3247 3265 3188 3733 3033 
12/13/2001 803 774 4059 864 299 1054 3256 3285 3195 3760 3005 
12114/2001 806 773 4160 860 290 1038 3356 3387 3300 3870 3122r. 
12/17/2001 820 783 4127 878 298 1085 4127 3344 3249 3829 3042 
12/18/2001 818 787 4125 874 306 111 9 4125 3338 3251 3819 3006 
12/19/2001 827 795 4212 887 319 11 38 3385 3417 3325 3893 30741 12/20/2001 835 802 4449 904 318 11 56 3614 3647 3545 4131 3293 
12/21/2001 828 803 4722 892 320 1167 3894 3919 3830 4402 3555 
1212412001 834 802 5083 898 308 1156 4249 4281 4185 4775 3927 
12/25/2001 832 810 5495 903 306 1156 4663 4685 4592 5189 4339 
1212612001 824 802 5470 896 299 1152 4646 4668 4574 5171 4318 
12127/2001 825 810 5463 884 313 1153 4638 4653 4579 5150 4310 
12128/2001 809 794 5172 859 303 1134 4363 4378 4313 4869 4038 
12131/2001 818 799 4404 870 308 1128 3586 3605 3534 4096 3276 
1/212002 766 707 4376 824 293 1124 3610 3669 3552 4083 3252 
1/3/2002 755 698 4128 805 294 1065 3373 3430 3323 3834 3063 
1/412002 742 689 3983 806 292 1056 3241 3294 3177 3691 2927 
117/2002 748 696 3975 820 304 1084 3227 3279 3155 3671 2891 
1/812002 746 695 4050 826 300 1079 3304 3355 3224 3750 2971 
119/2002 758 706 4460 841 306 1113 3702 3754 3619 4154 3347 
1/10/2002 772 720 4484 857 317 1147 3712 3764 3627 4167 3337 
1/11/2002 769 721 4492 858 320 1139 3723 3771 3634 4172 3353 
111412002 779 727 4556 869 319 1161 3777 3829 3687 4237 3395 
1/15/2002 790 732 4626 863 318 1187 3836 3894 3763 4308 3439 
1/16/2002 786 731 4531 867 318 1150 3745 3800 3664 4213 3381~ 
1/17/2002 770 717 4581 853 312 1162 3811 3864 3728 4269 3419 
1/18/2002 769 715 4656 839 306 11-59 3887 3941 3817 4350 3497 
1/21/2002 767 716 4553 842 308 1168 3786 3837 3711 4245 3385 
1/2212002 754 705 4454 828 300 1157 3700 3749 3626 4154 3297 
1/23/2002 735 690 4287 817 286 1117 3552 3597 3470 4001 3170 
1/24/2002 745 697 4210 827 293 1142 3465 3513 3383 3917 3068 
1/25/2002 748 695 4156 828 289 1146 3408 3461 3328 3867 3010 
1/28/2002 751 698 4101 833 293 1182 3350 3403 3268 3808 2919 
1/29/2002 778 716 4123 856 312 1231 3345 3407 3267 3811 2892" 
1/30/2002 771 713 4129 858 305 1230 3358 3416 3271 3824 2899 
1/31/2002 770 714 4352 865 301 1241 3582 3638 3487 4051 3111 
2/1/2002 776 717 4497 881 301 1245 3721 3780 3616 4196 3252 
214/2002 790 725 4581 890 305 1269 3791 3856 3691 4276 3312 
2/5/2002 782 720 4457 876 301 1252 3675 3737 3581 4156 32051f• 
2/6/2002 773 711 4470 869 290 1273 3697 3759 3601 4180 3197 
.21712002 787 719 4511 884 294 1332 3724 3792 3627 4217 31791 
2/8/2002 786 719 4412 885 291 1331 ' 3626 3693 3527 4121 3081j 
TABLEA7.4 
Exchange rate quotations (*) 
Against US dollar 
DATE Argentine 
peso 
(*) 
1/211998 1.00 
1/5/1998 1.00 
1/6/1998 1.00 
W/1998 1.00 
118/1998 1.00 
11911998 1.00 
1/12/1998 1.00 
1/13/1998 1.00 
1/14/1998 1.00 
1115/1998 1.00 
1116/1998 1.00 
1/1911998 1.00 
1/20/1998 1.00 
1/21/1998 1.00 
1/22/1998 1.00 
1/23/1998 1.00 
1/26/1998 1.00 
1/27/1998 1.00 
1/28/1998 1.00 
1/29/1998 1.00 
1/30/1998 1.00 
2/211998 1.00 
213/1998 1.00 
2/4/1998 1.00 
2/5/1998 1.00 
2/6/1998 1.00 
2/9/1998 1.00 
2/10/1998 1.00 
2/11/1998 1.00 
BaCk to contents 
Japanese Deutsche 
yen mark 
132.35 1.803 
133.60 1.825 
134.00 1.835 
131 .55 1.825 
132.67 1.822 
132.08 1'.823 
132.70 1.822 
131 .45 1.820 
130.90 1.821 
129.95 1.832 
129.45 1.834 
129.29 1.837 
128.42 1.839 
127.10 1.818 
127.28 1.805 
125.75 1.779 
126.58 1.794 
125.40 1.788 
125.09 1.813 
125.90 1.829 
127.08 1.830 
126.50 1.816 
125.97 1.812 
123.75 1.802 
123.58 1.786 
123.95 1.809 
124.18 1.818 
123.22 1.807 
123.65 1.821 
EURO Brazilian Mexican Chilean Uruguayan 
real peso peso peso 
-- ~~ -- ------ L....-- --~--
0.913 '\.116 8.055 440.150 
0.923 1.116 8.050 440.850 
0.927 1.11Ei 8.040 444.950 
0.923 1.117 8.045 449.250 9.980 
0.923 1.118 8.065 403.500 
0.924 1.118 8.180 460.500 
0.922 1.119 8.285 464.500 
0.921 1.118 8.165 457.500 
0.923 1.118 8.225 455.000 
0.927 1.12(1 8.220 458.500 
0.927 1.12(1 8.165 456.500 
0.929 1.12Ct 8.185 456.500 
0.930 1.12Ct 8.170 458.500 10.140 
0.922 1.120 8.215 458.000 
0.915 1.120 8.277 457.000 10.110 
0.903 1.121 8.285 458.500 
0.910 1.121 8.285 457.000 
0.908 1.122 8.260 449.000 10.095 
0.920 1.122 8.310 450.500 
0.927 ' 1.123 8.410 450.000 
0.928 1.123 8.450 455.000 
0.921 1.123 8.465 454.500 10.080 
0.919 1.124 8.400 452.500 
0.914 1.124 8.425 452.750 
0.907 1.124 8.415 451 .750 10.095 
0.918 1.125 8.439 451 .350 
0.922 1.125 8.407 449.450 10.095 
0.918 1.126 8.515 444.350 10.100 
0.922 1.126 8.465 442.950 10.100 
9/2412001 1.00 117.54 2.133 1.090 2.718 9.455 692.050 13.700 
9/25/2001 1.00 117.63 2.120 1.084 2.723 9.521 692.650 13.690 
9/26/2001 1.00 117.72 2.118 1.083 2.747 9.527 695.750 13.613 
9127/2001 1.00 119.63 2.132 1.090 2.678 9.525 696.150 13.610 
9/28/2001 1.00 119.56 2.146 1.097 2.670 9.514 693.220 13.650 
10/1/2001 1.00 120.22 2.133 1.090 2.689 9.480 695.250 13.700 
1012/2001 1.00 120.80 2.128 1.088 2.705 9.511 695.150 
1013/2001 1.00 120.57 2.139 1.093 2.721 9.524 699.450 13.785 
101412001 1.00 120.45 2.132 1.090 2.737 9.570 703.300 13.873 
10/5/2001 1.00 120.51 2.130 1.089 2.777 9.560 709.150 14.085 
1018/2001 1.00 119.88 2.124 1.086 2.760 9.565 714.200 
1019/2001 1.00 120.11 2.142 1.095 2.780 9.455 718.220 
10/10/2001 1.00 120.37 2.146 1.098 2.770 9.368 711.000 
10/11/2001 1.00 121.42 2.168 1.108 2.781 9.355 702.800 13.963 
10/12/2001 1.00 121.12 2.146 1.097 2.785 9.328 713.500 
1011512001 1.00 120.85 2.151 1.100 2.762 9.266 713.550 
10116/2001 1.00 121.25 2.153 1.101 2.710 9.195 704.450 14.038 
10117/2001 1.00 121.31 2.164 1.107 2.722 9.226 705.000 
10/1812001 1.00 121.10 2.165 1.107 2.760 9.197 709.350 13.928 
10/19/2001 1.00 121.20 2.176 1.112 2.734 9.212 714.750 13.913 
10/22/2001 1.00 122.44 2.193 1.121 2.721 9.237 708.150 13.918 
10/2312001 1.00 122.57 2.197 1.123 2.731 9.223 710.500 
10/24/2001 1.00 122.76 2.189 1.118 2.760 9.225 710.000 13.965 
1012512001 1.00 122.87 2.192 1.120 2.714 9.259 712.850 13.930 
1012612001 1.00 122.70 2.190 1.120 2.725 9.240 715.300 13.930 
10129/2001 1.00 121 .97 2.161 1.105 2.722 9.263 715.880 13.958 
10/30/2001 1.00 122.08 2.162 1.105 2.718 9.250 716.350 13.958 
10131/2001 1.00 122.42 2.172 1.110 2.697 9.259 713.050 14.050 
1111/2001 1.00 121 .90 2.167 1.108 2.672 9.288 713.650 14.065 
11/2/2001 1.00 121.73 2.167 1.108 2.673 9.276 713.950 
11/5/2001 1.00 121 .66 2.179 1.114 2.600 9.216 711.150 14.110 
11/6/2001 1.00 121 .24 2.187 1.118 2.610 9.213 704.800 14.11 
1117/2001 1.00 121.03 2.179 1.114 2.559 9.211 701.000 14.04 
11/8/2001 1.00 120.11 2.190 1.121 2.533 9.213 697.650 14.040 
11/9/2001 1.00 120.32 2.188 1.119 2.535 9.245 699.450 14.040 
11/12/2001 1.00 120.53 2.189 1.119 2.550 9.280 703.250 13.970 
11113/2001 1.00 121.56 2.218 1.134 2.520 9.250 689.150 
11/14/2001 1.00 121.56 2.217 1.133 2.544 9.198 686.150 13.979 
11/15/2001 1.00 122.40 2.218 1.134 9.211 682.150 13.970 
11/16/2001 1.00 122.93 2.212 1.131 2.527 9.202 678.250 14.023 
11/19/2001 1.00 123.13 2.225 1.138 2.520 9.148 674.900 14.020 
11/20/2001 1.00 122.58 2.214 1.132 2.554 9.168 680.880 14.000 
11/21/2001 1.00 123.22 2.226 1.138 2.543 9.158 674.500 13.990 
11122/2001 1.00 123.91 2.228 1.139 2.534 9.146 677.500 13.968 
11/23/2001 1.00 124.22 2.228 1.139 2.502 9.168 676.150 13.980 
1112612001 1.00 124.06 2.222 1.136 2.457 9.190 670.650 13.970 
11/27/2001 1.00 123.96 2.214 1.132 2.467 9.259 670.950 13.970 
11/2812001 1.00 123.06 2.203 1.127 2.482 9.268 676.250 13.800 
11/29/2001 1.00 123.86 2.204 1.127 2.542 9.289 686.850 13.828 
11/30/2001 1.00 123.48 2.182 1.116 2.499 9.224 686.150 13.820 
12/312001 1.00 124.15 2.195 1.122 2.452 9.229 676.150 13.900 
12/4/2001 1.00 124.18 2.197 1.123 2.437 9.231 669.150 13.825 
12/5/2001 1.00 124.14 2.201 1.126 2.436 9.235 671 .350 
12/612001 1.00 124.60 2.185 1.117 2.420 9.248 674.650 
12/7/2001 1.00 125.53 2.197 1.123 2.390 9.194 673.150 13.870 
12/10/2001 1.00 126.o1 2.196 1.123 2.332 9.187 664.400 13.970 
12/11/2001 1.00 126.01 2.192 1.120 2.368 9.151 666.150 14.010 
12/1212001 1.00 126.01 2.178 1.113 2.357 9.143 669.750 13.950 
12/1312001 1.00 126.07 2.188 1.119 2.373 9.078 670.650 13.950 
12/1412001 1.00 127.29 2.164 1.106 2.376 9.107 670.950 13.900 
12/17/2001 1.00 127.54 2.168 1.108 2.355 9.105 665.420 13.841 
12/1812001 1.00 127.85 2.165 1.106 2.305 9.103 663.650 13.870 
12/1912001 1.00 128.19 2.172 1.111 2.295 9.115 660.150 13.870 
12120/2001 1.00 128.66 2.173 1.111 2.335 9.165 667.650 13.870 
12121/2001 1.00 129.58 Z.200 1.125 2.343 9.130 664.650 
12/24/2001 1.00 129.95 2.230 1.140 2.338 9.093 663.450 
1212512001 1.00 130.88 2.226 1.138 2.335 
1212612001 1.00 130.89 2.221 1.135 2.325 9.135 660.950 13.896 
12127/2001 1.00 131.79 2.216 1.133 2.332 9.142 654.150 13.950 
1212812001 1.00 131.11 2.209 1.129 2.312 9.180 661.250 13.950 
12131/2001 1.00 131 .66 2.199 1.124 2.311 9.158 661 .250 14.430 
1/1/2002 131.65 1.124 9.153 
1/212002 132.13 2.165 1.107 2.302 9.106 651.750 14.770 
113/2002 131 .80 2.176 1.1 13 2.295 9.119 646.250 14.780 
1/412002 131.04 2.185 1.117 2.331 9.167 652.650 14.750 
117/2002 131.09 2.190 1.120 2.327 9.158 655.150 14.750 
1/812002 132.86 2.190 1.120 2.374 9.188 663.250 15.130 
1/9/2002 133.15 2.194 1.122 2.375 9.219 670.700 14.200 
1/1012002 132.39 2.193 1.122 2.423 9.277 682.150 14.050 
1/1112002 1.675 132.17 2.196 1.123 2.400 9.221 676.650 14.150 
1/1412002 1.654 132..05 2.187 1.118 2.395 9.224 666.300 14.200 
1/1512002 1.700 131.14 2.214 1.132 2.375 9.175 667.650 14.190 
1116/2002 1.835 132.07 2.214 1.132 2.363 9.185 670.150 14.100 
1/1712002 1.945 132.54 2.219 1.135 2.378 9.115 669.100 14.090 
1/18/2002 1.925 132.57 2.211 1.130 2.365 9.123 671.650 14.100 
1/21/2002 1.850 132..72 2.214 1.132 2.373 9.133 670.650 14.175 
1/22/2002 1.900 133.87 2.207 1.127 2.380 9.149 666.750 14.405 
1/23/2002 1.875 134.62 2.227 1.138 2.378 9.137 671.500 14.675 
1/24/2002 1.650 134.69 2.227 1.139 2.39€1 9.129 669.100 14.650 
1/2512002 1.765 134.46 2.261 1.156 2.407 9.145 671.200 14.550 
1/2812002 1.780 133.44 2.270 1.161 2.424- 9.169 678.720 14.300 
1/29/2002 1.800 133.46 2.259 1.155 2.437 9.218 679.150 14.300 
1/30/2002 1.925 132.89 2.271 1.161 2.433 9.151 6n.550 14.300 
113112002 1.940 134.68 2.276 1.164 2.413 9.148 678.750 14.310 
2/112002 133.07 2.270 1.160 2.420 9.160 678.900 14.320 
2/412002 132.35 2.248 1.150 2.423 9.163 687.350 14.550 
2/512002 133.93 2.254 1.152 2.420 9.124 689.650 14.355 
216/2002 133.69 2.256 1.153 2.436 9.108 688.000 14.460 
2/7/2002 133.75 2.248 1.149 2.463 9.155 687.250 14.530 
2/812002 134.71 2.242 1.147 2.456 9.072 685.250 14.550 
2/11/2002 2.025 133.38 2.231 1.141 2.457 9.093 684.750 14.410 
2/1212002 1.900 132.64 2.231 1.141 2.457 9.064 6n.500 14.430 
2/1312002 1.965 133.27 2.245 1.148 2.409 9.070 673.650 14.430 
2/14/2002 1.900 132.12 2.238 1.145 2.431 9.081 676.600 14.550 
2/1512002 1.900 132.61 2.239 1.145 2.427 9.060 677.150 14.440 
2/18/2002 2.065 132.71 2.246 1.149 2.432 9.065 673.250 
2/19/2002 2.025 133.57 2.232 1.141 2.425 9.088 672.950 14.530 
2/2012002 2.055 133.73 2.249 1.150 2.420 9.073 674.650 15.125 
212112002 1.995 134.20 2.247 1.149 2.423 9.088 673.250 15.125 
2/2212002 2.025 134.15 2.234 1.142 2.422 9.095 675.450 15.130 
212512002 2.055 133.86 2.250 1.150 2.394 9.067 673.650 15.250 
2126/2002 
2127/2002 
212812002 
3/112002 
31412002 
31512002 
316/2002 
3n120o2 
3/8/2002 
311112002 
311212002 
311312002 
311412002 
311512002 
3/1812002 
3119/2002 
312012002 
312112002 
312212002 
312512002 
312612002 
312712002 
3128/2002 
312912002 
41112002 
412/2002 
41312002 
4/4/2002 
415/2002 
4/8/2002 
419/2002 
4/10/2002 
4111/2002 
411212002 
4/1512002 
411612002 
4/17/2002 
2.140 
2.115 
2.105 
2.065 
2.000 
2.030 
2.073 
2.190 
2.240 
2.280 
2.390 
2.370 
2.370 
2.300 
2.335 
2.420 
2.450 
2.380 
2.970 
2.975 
2.865 
2.950 
2.950 
2.935 
2.935 
2.900 
2.940 
2.740 
2.700 
2.760 
2.770 
2.780 
2.775 
2.825 
2.950 
2.750 
2.830 
134.68 
134.28 
133.36 
133.46 
132.22 
132.24 
130.67 
127.56 
128.65 
128.37 
129.04 
129.47 
129.16 
129.00 
131.33 
132.08 
131 .40 
132.07 
132.88 
133.36 
133.04 
132.64 
132.76 
132.73 
133.48 
133.21 
132.74 
132.33 
131.58 
131.68 
130.88 
130.71 
131.49 
131.96 
132.17 
131.20 
130.70 
2.264 
2.259 
2.250 
2.260 
2.250 
2.243 
2.232 
2.218 
2.235 
2.235 
2.233 
2.233 
2.216 
2.215 
2.216 
2.216 
2.209 
2.216 
2.228 
2.229 
2.230 
2.242 
2.245 
2.244 
2.221 
2.224 
2.220 
2.226 
2.227 
2.235 
2.220 
2.222 
2.217 
2.224 
2.224 
2.216 
2.197 
1.157 
1.155 
1.150 
1.155 
1.150 
1.147 
1.141 
1.134 
1.143 
1.143 
1.142 
1.142 
1.133 
1.133 
1.133 
1.133 
1.129 
1.133 
1.139 
1.140 
1.141 
1.146 
1.148 
1.147 
1.136 
1.137 
1.135 
1.138 
1.139 
1.143 
1.135 
1.136 
1.133 
1.137 
1.137 
1.133 
1.123 
2.395 
2.356 
2.364 
2.345 
2.326 
2.332 
2.368 
2.371 
2.352 
2.356 
2.330 
2.349 
2.344 
2.347 
2.341 
2.343 
2.344 
2.342 
2.362 
2.365 
2.347 
2.323 
2.325 
2.296 
2.298 
2.312 
2.301 
2.277 
2.284 
2.277 
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9.075 
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9.048 
9.011 
9.033 
9.003 
9.003 
9.035 
9.002 
9.044 
9.039 
9.040 
9.007 
9.026 
9.028 
9.050 
9.100 
9.153 
9.175 
9.162 
9.240 
674.800 
673.150 
672.150 
668.250 
665.650 
667.420 
667.200 
664.650 
660.150 
662.050 
661.250 
655.760 
654.550 
659.100 
656.750 
657.250 
657.650 
662.650 
688.450 
670.150 
667.350 
657.150 
656.450 
658.500 
656.000 
657.200 
662.350 
658.950 
647.150 
647.800 
648.150 
641 .050 
645.650 
642.650 
647.650 
647.170 
644.550 
14.710 
14.820 
14.800 
15.080 
15.000 
15.110 
14.950 
14.950 
15.145 
15.275 
15.370 
15.395 
15.100 
15.090 
15.225 
15.225 
14.800 
14.945 
14.750 
15.800 
15.400 
15.640 
15.640 
15.710 
15.800 
15.800 
16.140 
16.120 
16.1<15 
16.200 
16.500 
16.600 
16.700 
4/18/2002 
4/19/2002 
4/22/2002 
4/23/2002 
4/24/2002 
4/25/2002 
4/26/2002 
4129/2002 
4130/2002 
5/1/2002 
5/2/2002 
5/312002 
5/6/2002 
5n12oo2 
5/8/2002 
5/9/2002 
5/10/2002 
5/13/2002 
5/14/2002 
5/1512002 
5/1612002 
5117/2002 
5/20/2002 
5/21/2002 
5122/2002 
512312002 
5/24/2002 
5/2712002 
5/28/2002 
5129/2002 
5/3012002 
5/31/2002 
61312002 
6/412002 
6/512002 
6/6/2002 
6/7/2002 
3.000 
3.120 
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3.120 
3.120 
3.130 
3.120 
2.950 
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124.18 
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123.58 
124.14 
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2.192 
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2.201 
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2.178 
2.169 
2.164 
2.173 
2.158 
2.165 
2.132 
2.130 
2.138 
2.162 
2.151 
2.140 
2.145 
2.167 
2.145 
2.147 
2.125 
2.124 
2.126 
2.114 
2.123 
2.125 
2.125 
2.106 
2.092 
2.087 
2.094 
2.077 
2.082 
2.083 
2.064 
2.073 
1.122 
1.120 
1.124 
1.125 
1.120 
1.114 
1.109 
1.107 
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1.103 
1.107 
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1.093 
1.105 
1.100 
1.094 
1.096 
1.108 
1.097 
1.098 
1.087 
1.086 
1.087 
1.080 
1.086 
1.086 
1.086 
1.077 
1.070 
1.067 
1.070 
1.062 
1.065 
1.065 
1.055 
1.060 
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2.372 
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2.381 
2.407 
2.407 
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2.465 
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2.462 
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2.47~1 
2.489 
2.52-4 
2.528 
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2.52-4 
2.527 
2.513 
2.512 
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2.535 
2.596 
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2.677 
2.635 
9.235 
9.273 
9.255 
9.268 
9.285 
9.328 
9.325 
9.369 
9.395 
9.410 
9.466 
9.446 
9.510 
9.487 
9.415 
9.474 
9.505 
9.535 
9.485 
9.470 
9.470 
9.463 
9.495 
9.496 
9.531 
9.536 
9.568 
9.553 
9.565 
9.696 
9.681 
9.645 
9.645 
9.740 
9.738 
9.765 
9.740 
647.450 
647.850 
654.200 
653.950 
653.950 
652.750 
651 .150 
647.750 
646.850 
646.970 
651 .950 
653.150 
656.650 
652.750 
652.350 
658.100 
655.150 
657.750 
654.650 
651.650 
651.750 
651.350 
651.950 
651.950 
656.400 
655.750 
656.150 
656.150 
654.050 
655.550 
655.550 
659.650 
661.350 
660.750 
662.750 
660.650 
16.750 
16.800 
16.700 
16.700 
16.765 
16.925 
16.400 
16.550 
16.550 
16.780 
17.050 
16.950 
16.800 
17.000 
16.900 
16.870 
17.200 
17.200 
17.240 
17.200 
17.280 
17.300 
17.310 
17.300 
17.325 
17.225 
17.185 
16.650 
16.680 
16.450 
16.610 
16.750 
16.900 
17.250 
17.350 
SOUTHERN SCHOU.RS SENIOR PRo.JECT 
SENIOR PRO.JECT 
A sigrrificmt s:bolarly project. inwlviug rcscmdl. writing. «special pc:a1i I I"""""\ appropria&c ro the majcr m qucslioa. 
is ardiDarily camplcud. die smiar ya:r. 1"hc project is expo trd. to be of suf6ciemty high quality to wammt a gnldc of A 
md ra jus&ify public F""'""rimL 
Uadc:r the gtridmce of a~ advisor. the SaD« Project sbou1cl be m origiDal work. sbouJd use primary sources wbca 
applicable. sbaukl ~a table of mnrears IIIIi worb circd page. sboul4 give COil\iDciag eWL:ace ro support a SlrODg 
tbr::si3. md sbculd. use tbe md.bnds aad writiDg !lyle appropri8ll: to rhe dis:iplille. 
The cxzmpiS'Ud pmje;t, tg be turned in iP dugljs;nrc mu!t be IQRl"QY!;5i by the Hogoa Cgmmjttee in mrmtJt~r:ion wjtb lbe 
wan·, mpqyi3ing prpfrpr three W!tCb prjgr tp ntJmrign. Plc:asc iDcludc the advi$Qr•s name on the tide page. 
The 2-3 hours of cndit for this project is doot: u directed SUJdy or m a rcscarch class. 
Keeping in mind the above senior project description, please describe in as much detail as 
you can the project you will undertake. You may attach a separate sheet if you wish: 
Signature of faculty advisor~~ Expected date of completion Jt/Jfl,· 1 )o3 ! /~ .,..,.....;.;;;:..;;....._.&...-'.;- -~ 
Approval to be signed by faculty advisor when completed: 
This project has been completed as planned: ___ _ 
This in an .. A .. project: ___________ _ 
This project is wonh 2-3 hours of credit:_/...._~-~-"'----.-
~----~r------ J Advisor's Fmal Signature ~. ?".....,_ "* ,Af~l... l~t 03 
~~ ' I 
Chair. Honors Commine;:;IO!:~;...·---------- Date Approved: ____ _ 
Dt!ar Advuor. plt!ase w"te your JiJ:Jil1 ~luauon on the proJeCt on the ~ne stdt! of this page. Comment on the 
ciraracu":saa thai maitz thu ·•..t " qualil)l worie. 
The project will be a study of the recent Argentine economic failure. It should 
include sufficient history, foreign/domestic policies and how they relate to the countries 
economy, and analysis of outside forces affecting the argentine economy such as the 
IMF, U.S.A. and England. Though I am not sure yet as to the exact direction I will go, 
through my res~arch I plan to complete a thesis based paper giving more than a report of 
the present situation. 
April25, 2003 
To the Honors Committee: 
Greetings, 
This senior project is mostly based on statistical information compiled in graphs and charts 
in order to try to understand economic and political conditions in Argentina. From my discipline 
what I see as relevant to this investigation is the great impact on the national and global collective 
of economic issues and political views involved in the research. David attempts to approach some 
issues by means of statistics from international and local governmental findings and analysis of 
those results. 
After various attempts to fulfill the Honors requirement, Mr. Harold has managed to 
include some of the issues affecting the collective in Argentina, its many reactions to sudden 
economic changes, and a possible projection as a viable solution. This research essay has taken 
many hours of research and comparison. David provides factual research and statistics to support 
his claims on this paper. Mr. Harold not only addresses statistics, but expands on the economic 
impact of the recent instability to the social structure of the nation. Therefore I recommend the 
Honors Committee to grant a grade of"A" for two (2) semester hours for this investigation. 
As the committee reviews this paper I am sure some other questions will arise. Please let 
me know if I or David need to know about their relevance to the final grade of this investigation. 
Sincerely, 
aarra,Ph.D 
Chair, Modern Languages Department 
Southern Adventist University 
423-238-2746 
cparra@southern.edu 
